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In the few cases of the eighteenth century which discuss'

the effect of delay on the part of the plaintiff in seeking
specific performance, we found that there appeared to be
the underlying assumption that one must be diligent in
asserting his iights in equity.2 The first cases of the nineteenth century relate to this branch of our subject ;3 they are
Hertford v. Bore4 and Guest v. Homfray.5 The contrast
between them is instructive. In the first case the vendor
and the vendee of land entered into extended ne'The First Paper dealing with the English cases of the eighteenth
century will be found in 5o A. L. R. (0. S.), 639.
'5o A. L. R. (0. S.), 649.
'The other branches are: -Those which discuss the amount of time
which, in the contract sought to be enforced, the plaintiff had to fulfill
his promises, and those which deal with the consequences of an
admitted default in respect to time. See 5o A. L. R. (0. S.), 639.
s Ves. 718, iSo.
'5 Ves. 8M8, i8or.
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gotiations in respect to the title. The vendee remaining unsatisfied with the title, the vendor wrote to
him asking him to say positively whether he would
take the title or not. The vendor also said that if the
vendee did not act he, the veridor, would have to file
a bill against him. The vendee returned no answer to this
letter. The vendor did not bring his bill for fourteen
months. Lord Loughborough sets aside the defence of
laches, remarking that "one can easily imagine circumstances might have happened that would have made it
In the second case,
peevish to have done it immediately."
the vendor's solicitor informed the vendee that no better
title could be made than the one exhibited. The vendee
at once gave notice that he repudiated the contract. The
vendor, without notice to the vendee, took steps to remove
his objections to the title, and in slightly less than a year
submitted another abstract. The vendee refused to go on,
and the vendor brought his bill. Arden, in sustaining the
defendant's objection on the score of delay, takes the position that the plaintiff, on being notified that the defendant
considered the contract at an end, should have promptly
brought his bill or told the defendant that he would shortly
remove the objections to the title. 7 The contrast between
these cases indicates a tendency to require more prompt
action on the part of the plaintiff in bringing his bill if he
has received definite notice of the other party's intention
to avoid the contract if he can, than is required when the
negotiations concerning execution have ceased without any
positive stand having been taken by either party. The
remaining cases of the period under discussion, belonging to
this class, serve merely to emphasize this distinction and
illustrate what the court considers a fatal lack of diligence
on the part of a plaintiff in bringing his bill.8
'P. 720.
TP. 823.
'The other English and Irish cases, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, are: Moroe v. Blake, i B. & Bat. 63, i8o8 (The vendor,
after bringing his bill and being dispossessed of the land, waited nineteen years before pressing his suit. The plaintiff alleged poverty as an
excuse. The bill was dismissed) ; Wright v. Howard, x Sie. ,& Stu. x9o,
x823. (Fourteen years had elapsed between the contract, which was for
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The other cases we shall discuss deal with the meaning
of clauses relating to the time of fulfillment of the contract. Lord Eldon in Paine v. Meller,* the first case
involving time coming before him, followed the thought
first expressed by Wilson in Pincle v. Curteis;10 that, in a
contract for the sale of land, the vendee waived any right

he might have had to refuse to take the land after the time
fixed in the contract for a conveyance, by continued discussion of the title after the day had passed.1
It will be remembered that one of the questions which
the eighteenth century cases left unsettled was, whether it
was possible for two persons contracting for the sale of land
to provide that if a good title could not be made out by a
particular day the contract was to be at an end, Lord
Loughborough holding that there was no reason why this
should not be done, while Thurlow seems to have denied the right of the parties to make the termination of
the contract depend on such a circumstance.1 2 In the case
just mentioned, Paine v. Meller, Lord Eldon intimates that
as a day had been fixed for the completion of the sale, and
the vendor was not ready with a good conveyance on this
the sale of land for mill purposes, and the argument. The delay seems
to have been due partly to the plaintiff, but principally to the death of
one of the parties and the rules of the court. Vice-Chancellor Leach dismissed the bill); Heaphy v. Hill, 2 Sim. & Stu. 29, 1824. (Vendee gave
notice of repudiation. Vendor waited nearly two years before bringing
bill. Bill dismissed without comment.)
'6 Ves. 349, 1801.
104 Bro. C. C. 329, 1793, 332; supra, 5o A. L. R. (0. S.), 645.

' The same idea appears again in Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 264, 1802, 271,
277; Wood v. Bernal, i9 Ves. 220, 1812; Levy v. Lindo, 3 Merm. 8i,

1817, 841. These were all cases decided by Lord Eldon. In the first he
regarded the fact that the defendant was Willing to receive and examine
an abstract of title within five days of the alleged time for completion,
which-abstract was not returned before the time, as conclusive evidence
of waiver. In Hudson v. Bartram, 3 Mad. 44o, I818, Vice-Chancellor
Leach drew the same inference from the fact, that the defendant, when
the assignee of a lease did not pay on the day promised, not only
failed to take steps to dispossess him, but sent him the landlord's bill
for rent.
'Lloyd v. Collett, 4 Bro. C. C. 470, 1793, supra 5o A. L. R. 645,
646. Greson v. Riddle, 1783, reported in Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 268,
.supra, 59 A. L. R. (0. S.) 643, 644.
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day, the vendee had his choice "to go on with the bargain
or to repudiate the contract,"' 3 thus at the outset apparently
taking the position that the parties to a contract for a sale
of real property can fix a time for its completion, and also
intimating that when the contract provides that the purchase money shall be paid on a particular day, "when a
good conveyance will be made," the vendor must be ready
with his title on this day if he would put himself in a position to insist on a specific performance. 4 This dicta of
:Eldon's, however, did not remove all doubt as to the correctihess of Lord Loughborough's position as opposed to
that of Lord Thurlow, for the next year Sir William Grant,
3
expressed the opinion "that it
in Wynn v. Morgan,"
whole
current of authorities," to say
would contradict the
make a completely good title
cannot
that "if the plaintiff
ought
to have been carried into
the
contract
the
time
at
for
an execution."' 8 His
can
come
execution,. he never
idea appears to have been that when a time is fixed for the
completion of a contract, in order that the defendant may
successfully set up the failure of the plaintiff to complete
on time, he must allege and prove that the completion on
time was material to him. 17
The next and perhaps the leading case of the period in
' P. 351.

"For Lord Eldon's subsequent repudiation of this last position, see
note 29, infra.
117

Ves. 202, 1802.

"P. 205.
"The defendant in the case before Sir William Grant, instead of
alleging that time was material to hini, took the position that as a good
title could not have been made on the day provided for completion, the
agreement was not reciprocal. To have acceded to this argument the

court would have had to have reversed those cases where the plaintiff
had had specific performance, though he had not a good title at the
time the bill was brought. In none of these cases was the position
taken, that the plaintiff had broken a condition precedent by non-fulfillment on a particular day. In the case before the court an exact
time of completion was either an element of the contract or iUwas not.
Counsel, by omitting to argue this question, and relying on want of
mutuality as a defence, were met by the settled principle referred to,

that it was not necessary for the vendor to have a good title at the time
he brought his bill. Compare Dyer v. Hargrave, io Ves. 55, 18o5,
5o8.
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reference to time is one decided by Lord Eldon, Seton v.
1 8 The opinion considered as a whole tends strongly
'Slade.
towards what we may call "a lenient dealing with the element of time," at least in a contract for the sale of real
property.1 9 The opinion begins with the assertion that time
is not treated at law as in equity, instancing the case of forfeitures, though with characteristic caution the chancellor
refuses to assert, whether, in the case of contracts for purchase, there is a different rule in equity in regard to time
than there is at law. 20 He mentions a reason for regarding
the question of time in such contracts differently in the two
courts; namely, that in equity, though not at law, the land
from the moment of the contract of purchase is the land of
the vendee.2' He also asserts that the cases before Lord
Thurlow go upon the fact of the difficulty of making clear
titles to estates, which caused the court to regard objections
on the score of delay as "frivolous." The paragraph as a
that he sympathizes
whole leaves one with the impression
22
with both of these positions.
The chief importance of the case, however, lies in Lord
"7 Ves. 264, 18o2.

"The facts of the case are of little importance. There was a contract for the sale of an estate, the purchase money to be paid within
two months. Lord Eldon held that this did not obligate the vendor
to complete the title within that time, though the inference is that the
purchaser need not pay until he gets a good title. This was all that
was absolutely necessary for the decision. The defendant alleged that
subsequent to the contract the parties agreed on an exact day; Lord
Eldon did not think so, but, as previously pointed out (note ii supra)
held, that if they had, by his subsequent conduct the defendant had
waived a completion on the day.
P. 273. In Lloyd v. Collett, as reported in Mr. Vesey's note to
Harrington v. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 69o, Lord Loughborough, speaking of
this subject, takes the-position, that: "There is a difficulty to comprehend how the essentials of a contract should be different in equity and
at law." Lord Erskine, in speaking of a contract to purchase an
annuity, in Radcliffe v. Warrington, 12 Ves. 326, i8o6, 333, adopts Lord
Eldon's position, that time is treated differently at law than in equity.
" P. 274.
Pp. 274, 275. The warrant for Lord Eldon's assertion in regard to
"cases before Lord Thurlow" must be his personal recollection. The
assertion cannot, as far as the writer is aware, be gathered from reported cases.
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Eldon's contribution to the question whether the time of
completion can be an element of the contract which if not
lived up to terminates the contract. In a preliminary
opinion he intimates that time may be made of the essence of
the contract. 23 Later, in his main bpinion, he again refers
to the same idea, saying: "I do not say, whether terms
might or might not be introduced, that would make time
24
expressly of the essence of the contract."
It will be noticed that Lord Eldon does not say positively
that time may be of the essence of a contract, but he subsequently made a positive assertion to this effect in Levy v.
Lindo.2 5 He, however, never seems to have had any conP. 27o. Thig idea that the question to be determined was whether
"time was of the essence" of the contract had been, as we have noted
(supra 5o A. L. R [0. S.], 647), first dwelt on by Chief Baron Macdonald in Tones v. Price, 3 Austr. 924, 1795, 925.

"' P. 275. In spite of these sentences the tendency of the entire case
is so strongly in favor of lenient dealing with alleged requirements in
respect to time, that Sir William Grant in Hall v. Smith, 14 Ves. 426,
1807, 433, says: "As to time, the case of Seton v. Slade is a modem
recognition of the doctrine of Lord Hardwicke, that time is not of the
essence of the contract."
23
Mer. 81, 1817, 84. Lord Eldon here says that Lord Thurlow
on occasions without number said that "time is not the essence of the
contract, and that not even the agreement of the parties can make it so."
He then adds: "I have deviated from that rule, so far as to say that
time may, in certain cases be of the essence of a contract." On which
it need only be said that Lord Thurlow does not seem to have spoken of
"the essence of a contract" in connection with time in any reported case;
that the reported cases before Thurlow involving the question do not
exceed three, and that there is no record of Lord Eldon, having before
this time positively taken the position that the parties could make
time essential. Lord Eldon again asserts that time may be of the essence
of the contract in Boehm v. Wood, I J. & W. 419, 1820, 42o, saying,
"When I came into this court the doctrine was, that you could not
make time the essence of the contract. I attempted to overrule it, and
I hope on satisfactory grounds." Here he ignores the position taken
by Lord Loughborough, see supra 5o A. L. R. (0. S.), 645, who much
more than Eldon set his face against the reported position of Thurlow.
Vice-Chancellor Leach in Hudson v. Bartrama, 3 Mad. 447, 1818, 447,
gives Lord Eldon the credit of having settled the long doubt whether
-time could be made of the essence of the contract. This much is undoubtedly Lord Eldon's due. Though the opinions in all the cases
quoted are dicta, as in all time was held not to be of the essence of the
contract before the court, we do not find any doubt after 1817 that
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tract before him in which he could be induced to consider
any particular time for the plaintiff to fulfill his promises,
as essential to his right to recover. Thus in Levy v. Lindo,
just referred to;28 he says, that in order to make time
of the essence of the tontract it must be shown to be so
by the terms of the contract. Yet what terms will make
time of the essence is doubtful, for in Boehn v. Wood,27 he
said he did "not find a single special word .
making
time the essence of the contract," 28 though the contract in
that case, which was for the sale of an estate, provided
"that an abstract of title should be made out and delivered
by the tenth of August," and "that the conveyance should
be executed on or before September 29."29 Two years
earlier Vice-Chancellor Leach, in Hudson v. Bartram,30 had
assumed, that where a time was fixed for the payment for
an assignment of a lease, and the contract contained an express provision that in case of non-payment the lease was to
be void and a penalty paid by the lessee, time was of the
essence of the contract;31 but in Reynolds v. Nelson,8 2
like Lord Eldon in Boehm v. Wood, he assumes that fixing
time may be made the essence of the contract, though in that
year such a doubt was intimated by Chief Baron Richards in Warde v.
Jeffery, 4 Price, 294, 297.
"3 Mer. 81, 1817, 84.
XI J. & W. 419, 1820.

"P.

422.

" On September 29 the defendant needing a house for immediate residence repudiated the contract. From the report it is doubtful whether
on September 29 the plaintiff could or could not have made a good title.
If he could, the question of time is not really in the case, and the part
of the opinion referred to is dictum. The later opinion, delivered on
May 30, 182o (see page 422), leaves the impression, that if a good title
could then be made specific performance would be granted. Compare
with the earlier case -of Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, i8ol, where he
intimates that the vendee can terminate the contract when the contract
provides that the money shall be paid and the conveyance made on a
given day and on that day a good title cannot be made out. Supra,
note 9.
"o3 Mad. 44o, i818, 447.
'The opinion was in a sense dictum as he held the provision in
regard to the time of payment had been waived.
"6 Mad. 18, i821, 26.
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a date for the conveyance in a contract for the sale of real
property does not make time of the essence of the contract.3 3
In the cases of the eighteenth century we found traces
of the idea that the situation of the parties or the nature of
the subject matter should have a bearing on.the legal effect
of a lapse of time.a4 The idea reappears in the first quarter
of the nineteenth century, in the thought that the nature of
the subject matter affects the question whether time is of
the essence of the contract. In Levy v. Lindo,85 Lord
Eldon admitted that there was no species of purchase
where time could with more reason be considered of the
essence of the contract, than in the case of a purchase of
a residence,38 though in the later case of Boehm v. Wood,T
he takes the position, that unless the defendant has made
time of the essence by express words, he cannot say, that time
is of the essence because he intended to use the land purchased as a residence. On the other hand, in Whitby v.
Cottle,3 s he says: "It has never been denied that the property may be of such'a nature, as to make time of the essence
of the contract, although the contract does not contain one
' See also for a similar assertion Warde v. Jeffery, 4 Price, 24, 1817,
297, per Richards, Chief Baron. In the next reported case, Morse v.

Merest, 6 Mad. 26, 1821, Vice-Chancellor Leach apparently takes the
position that, where in a contract of sale the price is to be fixed by
valuers appointed by the parties, who shall report on or before a certain day, that the time for the report is of the essence of the contract.
At least he is reported to have said that, "in the case of a reference,
time is as essential in equity as at law." See page 27. The matter is
dictum as the defendant in the case before him had prevented the valuation and had no right to set up a delay arising out of his own misconduct.
"Hayes v. Caryll, I Bro. P. C. 126, Tom. Ed. i7o2; Newman v.
Rogers, 4 Bro. C. C. 391, 1793, 50 A. L. R. (0. S.), 64o, 646, 647.
"3 Mery. 8i, 1817, 84.
Before this, in the case of the City of London v. Milford, 14 Ves.
41, 1807, 58, he pointed out, that there was great difference in the effect
of a default in notifying the landlord of a desire for a renewal of a
lease, where the lease is for a term of years and where it is for lives,
the presumption being that greater strictness is required in a term of
years. He also points out that the nature of the subject "especially a
colliery" might make a difference.
"I J. & W. 419, 182o, 422.
i T. & R. 78, 1823.
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single word about it." 39 Comparing the opinions in the two
cases, they may be said to indicate a belief, that, though the
situation and intention of one of the parties has no effect on
the question of whether time is of the essence of the contract
unless it .isso made by express terms, the nature of the subject of the contract, apart from the particular use intended
by the purchaser, has an important bearing on the question. Vice-Chancellor Leach lays emphasis on the last mentioned principle in Doloret v. Rothschild.40
He says:
"Where a court of equity holds that time is not of the
essence of a contract, it proceeds upon the principle, that,
having regard to the rnature of the subject, time is immaterial to the value, and is urged only by way of pretence and
evasion."
But he adds: "That principle can have no
application where the subject matter of the contract is
stock, which, "from the nature of the subject .
is
'41
exposed to daily variation.
In the case of Warde v. Jeff ery,42 before referred to,
the court was of the opinion that time was not of the
essence of the contract, or at least if it were the defendant
had waived by continuing to discuss the title after the
alleged time for completion. In this case, after a long
course of negotiation, the defendant, without any previous
"P. 79. The case was a contract for the purchase of an annuity.

A time was fixed for the payment of the purchase money. Whether
time was of the essence of the contract or not was not finally decided.
I Sim. & Stu. 590, 1824.

"Pp. 598, 599. The case before him was not exactly a sale of stock
The plaintiff had had an option to purchase stock of the defendant,
provided he paid on a day certain. The defendant voluntarily extended
the time when the option could be taken up. The plaintiff, who in the
case sought the stock, had not taken up the option even on the day
to which his right to do so had been extended. The bill was dismissed. See Parker y.Frith, I Sim & Stu. 199, note, 18ig, for a case
where there was a lease of an iron foundry, and a delay occurred on the
part of the vendor of the lease in making a good title, the delay amounting to about nine months. The vice chancellor "considering the object
of the agreement" refused to direct a specific performance. In Wright
Y. Howard, i Sim. & Stu. 19o, 1823, 205, he refuses to make "any general
declaration as to the distinction between land contracted for as mere
property and land contracted for with a view to be used for a commercial establishment."
"4 Price, 294, 1817. Ante, note 25.
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notice, declared the contract off.

This the court held he

do. 43

This case would seem to hold, that where
could not
the time of completion has not been made by the parties
to the contract an essential element, or having been so made,
it has been waived, one of the parties, without the consent
of the other, cannot insist on any particular time of completion. Yet Vice-Chancellor Leach, discussing this subject,
in Reynolds v. Nelson,44 refuses to' decide whether, when

time was not of the essence of a contract, it can be made
essential by one of the parties giving notice to the other to
complete on a particular day. 45 The cases during the
period under discussion therefore, may be said to have
done no more than raise this interesting and important
question.
It remains to mention but two other ideas or principles
in relation to our subject found in the cases of the period
under discussion. One is announced by Lord Redesdale;
namely, that the failure of a person in possession of property for which he has paid, to demand a formal conveyance
for an indefinite time does not deprive him of a right to
seek such conyeyance. 46 The other principle is, that when
" P. 298.
"6 Mad. 18, 1821.
" P. 26. In the case before him the court thought that time was not
originally of the essence of the contract. The vendor notified the purchaser that if he did not complete by a day named he would consider
him as refusing to perform his agreement. Leach, V. C., thought that
this was not a notification that the vendor in case of the vendee's nonsettlement would then regard the contract as terminated. In Stewart
v. Smith, 6 Hare, 222, note, 1824, the defendant having abandoned
the contract (apparently he was justified in so doing owing to vendor's
delay and the state of the title) signified his willingness to go on
provided title could be made immediately. In this case Vice Chancellor
Leach of course regarded immediate completion as essential. From
the final sentence of his opinion, however, it might be inferred that one
party by specifying a time for completion, even after the contract had
been entered into, could make time essential. See page 223.
"Crofton v. Ormsby, 2 Sch. & Ief. 583, i8o6, 6o2, 6o3. Where the
purchaser is in possession and fails to-offer to pay the purchase money
until long after the time stipulated, his laches may of course defeat his
right to specific performance; see as an example, Alley v. .Deschamps,
13 Ves. 225, i8o6, where the purchaser was let into possession in z797,
promising to pay the purchase money in two, four and six years. He
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the failure of the plaintiff to complete his promise on time
is due to an act of the defendant, the defendant cannot set
47
up the delay.
A striking circumstance in relation to this period is that
practically nothing is said of the possibility of treating time
as an element of the contract the breach of which can be
compensated by the payment of money damages by the
defaulting party, though this was the period in which the
practice of giving specific performance with compensation to the defendant for the inability of the plaintiff to
4
perform all his promises, was first recognized. "
To compare for a moment the cases of the period we
have just discussed with those of the eighteenth century.
In the earlier cases, down to and including the time of
Lord Thurlow, we find dominant the thought that time
may be disregarded by a court of chancery, even though the
parties intended it to be an element of the contract. The
reaction from this position is found in the decisions of Lord
Loughborough, who would treat provisions in regard to
time in a contract like provisions in regard to anything
else. Lord Eldon, by his emphasis on the idea that the
never paid anything except the first deposit, and in i8oo became a
bankrupt. The bill was brought in 18o2 by his assignees. Erskine, C.,
dismissed the bill without any real discussion. Nothing is said about
the payment of interest as compensation for the delay. There was no
excuse for the delay except that the purchaser lacked the necessary
funds.
' 7 Stated by Vice Chancellor Leach in Morse v. Merest, 6 Mad. 26,
182,

27.

'As early as the case of Vernon v. Stephens, 2 P. Wims. 66, 1722,
the thought was advanced that interest was always compensation for the
non-payment of money on time. (5o A. L. R. [0. S.], 642.) This
was denied by Lord- Loughborough in Newtman v. Rogers, 4 Bro. C. C.
39i, 1793 (5o A. L. R., 646). In Ornerod v. Hardman, 5 Ves. 722, i8oi,
732, Justice Chambre said that compensation could be given for the
non-delivery of possession at the time stipulated. (5o A. L. R. [O. S.],
651.) Sir William Grant makes a similar suggestion in Dyer v. Hargrave, io Ves. 5o5, 18o5, 5o8. As far as the writer is aware there is no
other mention of the subject during Lord Eldon's time. We do not
even find it discussed in a case like Alley v. Deschamps, 13 Ves.
225, 18o6, where there was delay on the part of tie, plaintiff in the
payment of the purchase price, and the defendant was in possession.
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question to be decided is always whether time is the essence
of the contract before the court, and even by his repeated
express recognition of the fact that provisions in regard to
time may be waived-by the parties, changes the whole point
of view from that which would ask "What provisions of
the -contract in regard to time may we disregard?" to
"What is the real intention of the parties in regard to
time? How much importance did they attach to it?"
This change in the method of examining the cases presented marks a real advance. That Lord Eldon himself
strongly reacted to the feeling that time, at least in contracts
respecting the sale of real estate, was of litle importance
cannot be questioned. Looked at merely from the facts of
the cases before him and his decisions, the period would
appear to- represent considerable disregard of stipulations
in respect to time. This effect is in part neutralized by the
repeated statement, that the parties might have provided
for the exact fulfillment of the condition in respect to time.
The employment of the word "essence" was in a sense
unfortunate. The term "of the essence of a contract" is
not clear. In relation to time it may mean merely that time
is part of the contract. If this is the intended meaning, the
statement, "that time is part of the contract," would be
less liable to be misunderstood. For the term "of the
essence of the contract" may also mean, that there are two
kinds of provisions in contracts, the essential and the
non-essential, the inference being. that a' court of equity
will disregard the non-essential. Yet the very possibility
of taking one or both of these meanings from the expression, well suited the mental attitude of Lord Eldon: He
saw clearly that what should be ascertained was the importance to the parties of the element of time. To him this
perception was sufficient. It was not a need of his intellect
that he should analyze his own point of view to determine,
whether he was really trying to ascertain whether time was
part of the contract, or admitting it to be part, an important
part. In nine cases out of ten the result would be the same.
The very lack of entire clearness in the expression reflected
the lack of logical or orderly analysis characteristic of the
great Chancellor. The expression served to direct the
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attention to the fact that the real intention of the parties
in respect to time was the problem which the courts had
to solve, and for Lord Eldon that was enough.
In the next paper I hope to conclude the examination of
the English cases.
"William Draper Lewis.

